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and the remainder divided between the army, navy, and marines. Even as the Vietnam War expanded, U.S. force levels in Japan continued to decline

By the mid-1960s, the United States all but abandoned its effort to promote large-scale Japanese rearmament. The seir-defense forces totaled around 250,000 throughout the decade. In place of size, the Defense Department messal Japan to improve the quality of its air and maritime forces.

The repair of unmunication, ammunition and the storage, and recreational faculties the U.S. military retained in Japan with the critical components of Asian defense strategy. These installations along with those in Okinawa, Guam, South Korea. Taiwan, and the Philippines, formed a coordinated network east of Hawaii. Bases on Okinawa were especially vital to the air war in Vietnam. One million military transport and combat flights originated in the Ryukyus between 1965 and 1973. KC 135 ranker planes refueled B 52 bombers flying from Guam to Indochina, and the B-52s sometimes flew directly from the Ryukyus. Unrestricted by the 1960 security treaty. American forces stered chemical and nuclear weapons on Okinawa. Nearly three fourths of the 400.000 forts of supplies required each month by American troops to the analysis of the passed.

In December of that year Admiral 115 Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces, declared that without Okinawa we couldn't continuitions of the Shorp on Start

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to be Him to be the West to be to maintenance and repair on maxilities on to be a few as shorth dear millions of following population in the state of the following or orbital forms of a few millions of following the following

Although the sociarity treaty barred the United States from introducing polear weapons to Japan without permission, the secret protocol of 1960 mitted nuclear-lader planes and ships to "transit" in ugh the country, wrican war plans and informal procedures followed by local commaniers stretched this loophole even further. Air force transport planes stationed on Pacific islands were assigned, in case of a war alert, to transport

nuclear weapons to U.S. air bases in Japan without obtaining Tokyo's approval. The weapons would then be deployed against targets in Northeast Asia.³⁷

While visiting Japan in the early 1960s as a Rand Corporation analyst working on a Pentagon study, Daniel Ellsberg uncovered a more serious collation of the security treaty. The small marine air base at Iwakuni, on the Inland Sea, had a handful of planes assigned to attack some two dozen targets in North Korea. China, and the Soviet Union. The marines arranged with local navy officials to store nuclear bombs on an LST barge (the "San Joaquin County") semi-permanently moored a few hundred yards offshore. It needed, the motorized barge would approach the beach and send its bombs ashore on amphibious tractors directly to the marine airfield. Neither civilian nor military commanders in Washington seemed aware of this. Navy records, Ellsberg discovered, fisted the LST as docked in Okinawa. The arrangement was "regarded as super-secret from the Japanese" and from civilians in the Pentagon.

The barge's vulnerability to substage and the high risk of public disclosure of its cargo prepared in these to a nucley the contation as hare-trianed hyposure in the first account the lapanese governorm to a supercondition of it ons are even drive 2 man town.

Place Nitze and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara as the hally irresponsible action it was possible to Imagine pressed the naviate remeds the problem, top admirals denou-

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By tills time. Reischauer found it nearly impossible to defend the proposition from the principle of the following states and been eroded by their opposition to a vietnam policitle vide. Then before this latest modent, he decided the find return to Harvarid during the commer of 1960. On a secretary of states this request to resign, the president and secretary of state lunched and then called Reischauer back to Washington for consult.

Johnson met with Reischauer for an nour on July 22. The Embahoped to speak about the damage America's China and Vietnam policic 2022446036;

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Sato to send emissaries to neutral and Communist countries in pursuit of peace in Vietnam. However, Harriman made clear, any settlement must be based on "America's position of strength." Humphrey took a conciliatory approach—tging the prime minister to "take a more active role in Southeast Asian development" and promote a "greater Japanese presence and participation in South Vietnam." The vice president suggested that "the Japanese might wish to provide full medical services for one or more provinces in Vietnam." Little came of these ideas.

The Japanese business community, concerned about American trade retaliation, urged Sato to placate Washington Farty in 1966, the prime minister issued public statements critical of China's nuclear program and recent H-bomb test. He restricted government credit to Beijing and barred a Chinese trade delegation from visiting Japan. Foreign Minister Shiina announced that in light of the security treaty, "Japan was not in a neutral position vis-a-vis the United States and North Vietnam." America fought to "maintain the security of the Far East" so Japan "had an obligation to furnish facilities and fertilories for this purpose."

China lost no time in alerting Japan to the risks it courted by tollowing the American lead in Votin in the Color, and the courted by tollowing

official stated. The U.S. bombs China, unto tunately the U.S. is out of our reach. We are not able to return the blow. However, it is not impossible for the form of the threat American and the state of possible for the form of the for

Let grounds and out of concern that apan would be tragged and because of its security bes with the troited States Rehermoned as a proceed place in vicination sensitiering into the vietnamese and respect of powers and its round from the socialist and forms what plantes which opposed are on more ideological grounds and saw the nonpartisan anti-wait as on more ideological grounds and saw the nonpartisan anti-wait is as a complicity of a threat to their tolowing Schotter padders and publications a curred the valo government of bring a co-conspirator with not a passive accomplice to, the war Demo- in front of the 115 embassive came so frequent by mid 1965 that not police assumed a nearly permanerate. Between 1965 and 1970, some eighteen million lapanese

imon surveys during 1965 to 1968 found a sizeable sity of Japanese conduction of war. Respondent to Saigon regime to the height of American escalation, two-the distof Japanese polled tayored adopting a more neutral foreign

policy. Only 20 percent wanted to continue the security treaty with the finited States after 1970 when it could be ended. (Support for the alliance increased in 1969 when Nixon began removing troops from Vietnam.)

Despite these trends, neither grassroots nor elite opposition to the war ever threatened Sato's domination of the LDP or the party's monopoly of power. The anti-war movement failed to arouse the depth of passion that the anti-security treaty movement had in 1960. Many Japanese opposed the but still voted for the LDP.

The structure of Japanese politics and the LDP further mitigated the impact of the anti-war movement. Prime ministers were chosen by Diet members, not voters. LDP faction leaders controlled blocs of Diet members in the bargaining process that resulted in selection of a party leader/prime numster. Party barons and their followers forged and broke alliances to gain control of cabinet posts, patronage, and rewards for constituents and tampaign donors. Whenever possible, they avoided embracing popular states or grappling with divisive issue. The Victorian War was not serverwhelming a concern among voters as to receive the LDF to take hield of anti-war sentiment or risk losing its Diet majority.

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The completence of a spine the interest knows. The ling the other with moliture affects have a serve to used on is affected to admit and a theorem the bonds of the fraction of the resonance of the fraction of the frac

the American Military in Japan

In 1952, over 200,000 American military personnel to mainted on 2000 bases and installations in Japan. These numbers strank stolline next decade. By 1964 (excluding facilities and personnel on 45,000 military dependents, and the sailors of the Japan base fileet) the United States maintained in Japan twelver and 46,000 military personnel. Half of them were

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were doing throughout Asia. But Johnson delivered a harangue about anti-war senators who undermined his policies. Dispirited, Reischauer left the White the shared to the Senate where he shared his doubts ulbright and other members of the Foreign Relations (te days later the State Department announced his resignation of eareer diplomat U. Alexis Johnson as ambassador (o rokyo #

The war dogged Reischauer's final days in Tokyo. At farewell receptions he attended, "groups of vociferous young Americans and Japanese" stood at the entrance to the buildings "shouting profests against America's Vietnam policies." At one event the protestors even included "an acquaintance," Professor Howard Zinn of Boston University. Reischauer could "never forget him wildly beating on a drum in an effort to spoil the party given in Haru's honor."41

Japan and the Economic Dimensions of the Vietnam War

Capathatta to, and no one i chargo epiconica element manth matter material Japan and surrounding countries. Military orders encouraged technological transfer and innovation. With American industry producing at full capacity ever higher ievels of lapanese exports found a permanent inche in the U.S. opsiumer market. The expenditure of bidios of war related dor in a black Sparson that at the Whiteham is

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mercus for any or a second second second the according to was son home aparticle point the Ministry to beternational Trade and Industry had the best data, but issued is analyses in order to dampen charges of war probties Treasury officials used numbers close to the midlange estimates of the Japanese Finance Ministry and private tanks. At calculations came on top of the 5340 million, base becaute US procure 44. They also accounted for the fact that exports to the ments in land atheast Asia ivem on an upward curve when en da Umited State tion began.

MITI data for 1965 to 1972 indicates that Japan earned at least \$7 billion in "extra" sales of goods and services related to Vietnam. This included 51.77 billion in direct procurement by U.S. forces in Japan. \$2.83 billion in inclirect procurement by Vietnam and countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; and almost \$2 billion in indirect procurement in terms of additional export to the United States made possible by the war per year and possibly as much as \$1.5 billapan earned at least \$1 hon from the Vietnam Wal -

MITI Estimates of Japan's Earnings from Vietnam War, 1965-72 (in U.S. dollars on top of 1964 base of \$340 million)

_	1965	1965	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
);rect procurement	ń	134	188	251	303	323	28	285
Exports to U.S		55	246	369	438	371	256	162
Indirect procurement by Asian nations	77	256	392	444	517	404	400	400
Insals	93	445	826	1.064	1,258	1,098	437	547

MITI officials minimized Vietnam's impact by comparing war orders to total GNP. They noted that Korean-era procurement totaled about \$5.8 fullion in an economy only a sixth as large as that of lat-Vietnam era. Procurement at the peak of the Korean War represcent of the value of all lapanese exports, while durin Var her were about 12 percent of total exports. But however V101in that say by the profit as I am. sandcass, and califord with y and account, the area Japan (APA) expanded its purchases to cotton cloth, rubber, pg. ement, sheet iron, motorcycles, synthetic fibers, transceivers, pstant roodstuffs, electronic equipment, us well as with he procupably extended is gitts for Gis to princhase it post was the relies of the special and interest -11 + OD:

The 121 (- 1) - - 1 Although logares, undestry reflacted to positing is capens of munimons for use in Vietnam, petrochemical companies enjoyed a brisk trade in predictor "chemicals used to manufacture napalm, INI, and othe exploaces. In the late 1960s, these sales totaled between \$150 and \$50 million process becttoon manufacturers such as some built no weapons nat sold the APA guidance systems used in inditary approach missiles, and bombs MITI deleted many of these sales from its procurement calculations. and that it lacked detailed knowledge about the total a sline or end material sold privately to the U.S. inditary "

Japan accrued another benefit from recreational (R&R) spec Americans Between 1966 and 1969, about 50,000 military person tioned in Southeast Asia visited Japan annually. Hotels and trabid for contracts to serve the troops brought in on air charter stays. Hotels provided a billet, loaned the soldiers civilian arranged for their entertainment, somewhat as had been doing early Occupation. Each servicemen spent about \$100 per day, carning Japan a minimum of \$25 million a year.44

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